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Abstract. It has been argued that the West with its well-established 
democracies was largely responsible for the filling of the institutional 
vacuum the East experienced after the fall of totalitarian regimes in the 
eve of the 90s. Scholars of international relations and public policies 
loudly debated on the existent causality between the European 
enlargement and the administrative reforms Central and Eastern 
European countries experienced in the last two decades. Be it in the form 
of soft or hard law, financial aid or penalties, Western norms were 
supposed to have been transferred to acceding countries in a rather alert 
tempo, and with a high(er) rate of compliance success. This research 
builds on these arguments without yet embracing them completely and 
tackles the issue of Western values successful transfer to public 
administration reform planning in Romania. The main question it 
attempts to answer is to what extent substantial compliance to the 
European expectations for building a consolidated public administration 
was achieved. In doing so, it compares formal national discourses of 
successful public administration reform with personal experiences of 
Romanian public managers, four years after Romania’s accession to the 
European Union. Between 2005 and 2008, the Romanian Government 
acknowledged the need for developing a highly professional, apolitical 
category of civil servants later to be called “public managers”. These 
managers, young people that were offered Governmental grants to train 
themselves in Western universities, were supposed to guide national 
reforms from the inside of the system. Their informal role was to use their 
Western academic and training experiences and place them against the 
national background so as to plan and execute a “good” public 
administration reform. Was this achieved? What were the intervening 
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factors? The interviews performed on public managers from central 
government organizations are placed against the framework of post-
enlargement Europeanization studies and sustain the original hypothesis 
of the paper: there is a gap between reform discourse and reform 
practice, and transfer of Western values is hardly visible when the agents 
of this transfer are solely public managers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the first definitions of Europeanization in the social sciences 
framework was provided by Ladrech (1994); in his view, the Europeanization 
was an incremental process that aimed at integrating the economic and political 
dynamics of the EU within the domestic logic of policymaking. In turn, Knill 
and Lehmkuhl (1999) defined Europeanization as the impact of European 
policies on the internal structures of a member state. In their approach, being 
Europeanized was a consequence of the European impact and a synonym to 
“being changed by EU policies”. In analyzing how much change was involved 
in this causal relation, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), as well as Töller (2004), 
Bauer et al. (2007) or Sedelmeier (2011), for that matter, hypothesized that the 
domestic changes experienced by member (and applicant) states varied along 
the institutional arrangements provided by different EU policies. Radaelli 
(2000) on the other hand, spoke of the EU adaptational pressures member states 
were subject to and discussed the latter’s reaction to them in terms of coercion 
and mimetism. So did to some extent Grabbe (2006) when addressing the case 
of applicant countries and their accession process to the European Union.  
All these analyses above had in common a “top-down” approach, 
genuinely part of the so called “first generation” in the studies of 
Europeanization – national reactions to EU pressures were explained by 
assuming a legal, institutional or procedural misfit of the domestic setting 
against the European one. This approach proves useful also to the scope of this 
paper, as it assumes that Romania’s misfit in connection to the EU requirements 
on civil service reform may have contributed to the development of a new type 
of bureaucrat: the public manager. In fact, the argument goes that since 2000 
(the year when negotiation for EU accession started), the Romanian civil 
service was subject to a stick and carrot mechanism: should reforms 
successfully married the European milestones (e.g. they managed to be 
produced in a rather sustainable manner and on time), they would have 
generated (more) funding (e.g. via PHARE), (more) delivering of expertise (e.g. 
via twinning projects) or (more) political support (e.g. via awarding green 
flags). Subsequently, a lack of progress in the area would have implied less or 
no financial support to further strengthen the reform, a cut-down or a shortening 
in expert training via twinning projects as well as the flying of red flags alerting 
the public and the authorities on the unsatisfactory political  performance.   
Arguably, such an assumption may prove its merits during the accession period, 
in view of an uncertain finish (inside or outside the European Union); but what 
about after accession? As argued by the literature (Vachudova, 2009; Dimitrova 
and Toshkov, 2009; Meyer-Sahling, 2009; Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Diana-Camelia Iancu 
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Junjan and Iancu, 2011), post-accession trends of reforms are quite 
optimistically stable, yet rather realistically, less alert than prior accession. As 
such, it might be fair to assume that the Romanian civil service experienced an 
accelerated rhythm of reform between 2000 and 2007 and got stabilized after 
2007. This paper argues a slightly different turn of events: while assuming that 
the carrot of EU accession did play a role in balancing the existent misfit in 
civil service performance with the European expectations in the matter up to the 
year 2007, it provides two arguments for considering that not only the civil 
service reform stopped after accession, but that a de-form process started once 
the stick of European monitoring disappeared. As argued in this paper, the de-
form process implied a politicization of the civil service (from its top to its 
bottom) and a process of diminishing the “change-agent” role of public 
managers inside the system.  
 
2. In civil service for a political boss
(2) 
 
In 1971, William Niskanen developed a theory of bureaucratic 
inefficiency. His model of bureaucracy started from the assumptions previously 
made by Downs (1965) and Tullock (1965): first, that collective action should 
be explained through individual actions; second, that individuals are utility 
maximizers. Additionally it assumed that there are only two actors in the model 
world: the bureau chief (head of the agency) and the sponsor (the financing 
political body). They both maximize utility in the form of a bigger budget (the 
bureau chief) and re-election (politicians). The essential premise of the model is 
that of bilateral monopoly, which characterized the relationship between the 
bureau chief and the sponsor (Niskanen, 1971, p. 24). It consisted in the 
assumption that the bureau was placed in a monopoly position (unique seller), 
whereas the sponsor is in a monopsony position (unique buyer). The sponsor is, 
though, unaware of the real production costs of the bureau (informational 
asymmetry). From these assumptions (and a few others that I won’t mention 
here).
(3) Niskanen derives its famous conclusion: bureaucratic production is 
inefficient; the budgets will be greater than optimal and there will be a supra-
production of public goods (more than the ideal points of citizens and 
politicians).  
This model generated a large amount of subsequent literature; most of the 
following researches on bureaucracy focused on its efficiency, refining it or 
building other negotiation models between sponsor and bureau chiefs (Romer 
and Rosenthal, 1978; McGuire, Coiner, and Spancake, 1979; Miller and Mow, 
1983). Almost all, though, assumed a relative independence between 
bureaucrats and politicians and a fully developed bureaucratic system. There are Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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at least two problems here. First, in reality, we have different degrees of 
bureaucratization. Real states could be placed, thus, on an imaginary scale, 
starting from the fully politicisized (spoils) system and ending with a fully 
bureaucratic system. The bureaucracy models mentioned above will apply only 
to the fully bureaucratic systems (if any). Second, as discussed by Iancu and 
Ungureanu (2010), spoils and bureaucracies could hardly be analyzed in the 
same way. In an ideal bureaucratic organization, the civil servant is not 
dependent of the politicians and there are far more incentives to efficiently 
produce public goods, than in spoil systems. However, the independence of the 
civil servant from the politicians may cause losses to political firms
(4) and it is 
for this reason that normally, politicians prefer more politicized systems 
looking as much as possible as bureaucracies, so as the production of public 
goods to not be visibly affected. This last sentence refers to a problem of the 
collective action as identified by Downs (1957). Individuals are not motivated 
to monitor governmental actions, to inform themselves upon costs and levels of 
public goods production.
(5) For this reason, up to some point, politicization may 
pass unnoticed. Also, as long as for the rational ignorant, the production of 
public goods is not visibly affected, then it might arrive in a quantity and with a 
quality less than optimal without consequences for politicians. From this, 
politicians will rather have mixed systems of public administration – 
politicized, but as much as the de-professionalization to not be visible, and 
accordingly, the production of public goods to not show any shortages for the 
rational ignorant. This observation infers the reactivity to costs of politicians – 
politicians will politicize the public administration up to the point where the 
marginal cost of politicization exceeds its marginal benefits (Iancu and 
Ungureanu, 2010). What may be deduced from here is that if one observes 
change in the politicians’ costs, then one may witness changes in their actions 
as well. Concretely, the civil service system change with the politicians’ costs. 
The idea here is that politicians will positively react to institutional (or other 
kind of) incentives for maintaining a de-politicisized public. If these incentives 
are not present though, it is to be expected that they will act like political bosses 
of public administrators. 
 
3. …Under Weber’s roof, advocating NPM and JUG
(6)… 
 
In Economy and Society (1914, 1922), M. Weber largely presented and 
analyzed the benefits of a bureaucratic system of public administration. He 
described the bureaucratic organization by listing a series of organizational 
attributes like: rational-functionality, hierarchy and permanence. The Weberian 
bureaucracy provided competitive jobs (for experts) and fostered merit-based Diana-Camelia Iancu 
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selection and promotion criteria for its employees. In M. Weber’s terms: 
“Bureaucracy is an administration by trained experts. Only persons who qualify 
under general rules are employed. The possession of educational certificates or 
patents is usually linked with qualification for office.” (Weber, 1922, pp. 956-999). 
At another end of public administration reform,
(7) NPM advocated in 
favor of restructuring (public) bureaucracy following private sector patterns. 
The focus on: efficiency; output and performance assessment; private 
ownership and alternative forms of delivering the public services; management 
decentralization; and enhanced mechanisms for reporting and monitoring, 
become pillars of the theoretical argument developed by the NPM literature 
(Kaboolian, 1998; Gaster, 1999, p. 36; Gruening, 2001). As commented by   
T. Bovaird (2003, pp. 38-39), adherents of the NPM school of thought tended to 
wish for redesigning (“re-engineering”) organizational processes around the 
needs of service users and other stakeholders, while being concerned with the 
inefficiencies produced by political interference in managerial decisions. 
If coordination is to be considered the end state in which policies and 
programs of the government are characterized by minimal redundancy, 
incoherence and lacunae (Peters, 1998, p. 296), and “joined-up government” is 
a phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically 
coordinated thinking and action (Pollitt, 2003, p. 35), then “joined-up 
government” is being practiced before it was so named (Richards and 
Kavanagh, 2000; Ling, 2002, p. 639; Pollitt, 2003, pp. 36-37; Humpage, 2005, 
p. 49; Christensen et al. 2007, p. 390).  
As an umbrella term describing various ways of aligning formally distinct 
organizations in pursuit of the objectives of the government of the day (Ling, 
2002, p. 616) and a heavy British accent,
(8) JUG implies working across 
organizational boundaries (be it between portfolios or departments within a tier 
of government, different tiers of government, government and other sectors or 
the community etc.) without removing the boundaries themselves. This modus 
operandi is said to help strengthening the overall accountability of the public 
sector, by: achieving the democratic legitimacy through shared responsibility 
and building consensus around policies (McGhee, 2003, p. 348; Johnson, 2005, 
p. 6); make better use of scarce resources (Pollitt, 2003, p. 35); and promote 
innovation, by bringing together different people, backgrounds and 
organizations (SSA, 2007, p. 4). 
Prudence is surely necessary, as joint working should not be considered a 
panacea to the public sector’s problems (Barton and Quinn, 2001, p. 51). 
However, if reducing the scale to local government and considering the 
apparent increasing local institutional complexity given by the shift from local 
government towards more loosely structured local governance (Darlow et al., Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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2007, p. 118), it may be argued that JUG brings an interesting addition to the 
debate on the subsidiarity principle as defined by the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government.
(9) Arguments in favor of this view are possible to encounter 
once reading strategic documents aimed at reforming local government in the 
United Kingdom or Australia for that matter
(10). According to them, JUG is a 
model of decision making, which allows active bringing of the government 
closer to the people (DETR, 1998b: paragraphs 3.49, 3.59, 4.3; DETR, 1998a, 
paragraph 1.7, corroborated to paragraphs 1.9 and 1.14); while limiting (to an 
extent) the failures in achieving best value or acceptable standards of service 
(DETR, 1998b, paragraph 7.48; SSA, 2007, p. 4).
(11)  
Practicing JUG is not an easy task, however. “It is vital that we lose the 
skills of battle and find the skills of organization and partnership...”   
(H. Armstrong, 1997 in Wilson, 2000, p. 52); the organizational cultures, skills, 
capabilities, and management systems and structures that support collaborative 
and integrated ways of working become as such critical:  
[…] One of the principal barriers to successful joined-up service delivery 
is the assumption that better use of traditional government systems and 
processes will result in joined-up solutions. Traditional systems and processes 
are designed to deliver government services from centrally controlled, vertically 
organized agencies. These systems and processes become increasingly 
inappropriate as government agencies move away from traditionally organized 
service delivery towards more customer-centric joined-up approaches”. 
(Johnson, 2005, p. 4). 
Success may also be determined by: working towards shared goals that 
are clearly defined and mutually agreed; measuring and evaluating progress 
towards the goals; having sufficient and appropriate resources available; having 
strong leadership, directing the team and initiative towards the goal; and 
working well together with a sense of shared responsibility (Ling, 2002; Pollitt, 
2003, p. 44; Humpage, 2005, pp. 49-50; SSA, 2007, p. 5). Contrary to what it 
may be thought (in the light of so many critical success factors), joined-up 
arrangements aren’t rare; they often (as the literature shows) nurture in the 
fertile ground of post NPM governance structures and take the form of: 
1) Whole of Government Integration – characterized by a top down whole 
of government policy framework based on what government seeks to achieve 
followed by practical strategies to achieve whole of government integration 
(Johnson, 2005, pp. 16-18); 
2) Service Delivery Integration (integration around partnership agre-
ements) – the main feature of this sort of joined up arrangement is the collection 
together of information and services about a shared customer or common issue. 
These strategies seek to enhance the use of traditional centralized systems and Diana-Camelia Iancu 
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processes to deliver increased efficiencies and improved services. They are well 
suited to the role of government as a coordinator rather than a provider of 
services (Johnson, 2005, p. 19); or: 
3) Integration around Programs – which involve ongoing cooperation and 
collaboration by a community of problem solvers. Membership of the 
community may be voluntary; while this type of joined up arrangement may be 
ad-hoc.  
Be it Weberian bureaucracy, NPM or JUG these approaches to public 
reforms can hardly live together in harmony. For instance, pleasing the political 
boss could sometimes mean neglecting the customer; just as acting as expert 
might jeopardize their relation to the citizen (Aucoin, 1990; 2012). Confusion 
may be even more present when working inside an acceding country, interested 
in playing nice for the sake of the enlargement carrot, one faces the rhetoric of 
Weberian bureaucracy, combined with NPM and JUG under a mostly generous 
umbrella concept like ‘consolidated administration’. 
 
4. …Building a consolidated administration… 
 
In December 1995, when the European Council urged candidate countries 
to adjust their administrative structures up to developing consolidated 
administrations, the final accession criteria was settled. No later than 1996, the 
European Parliament in its Resolution reply to Agenda 2000 suggested that 
candidate countries should continue the process of developing their capacity 
and quality of administrative procedures, considering that reducing corruption 
is necessary (paragraph 47) and that:  “an efficient and trustworthy public 
administration is a vital element in the accession process, especially in regard to 
the consolidation of rule of law […]” (paragraph 12). Also, it recommended 
that candidate countries should “establish through appropriate constitutional 
measures efficient local, regional and national administrative structures, to 
encourage the presence of private sector in these tiers of government and to 
strengthen the financial control system for a future effective use of structural 
funds” (paragraph 13).  
It was then that one principle useful to the consolidation of public 
administration was firstly established: the decentralization principle. In 
addition, the European Parliament spoke of efficient administrations, effective 
use of structural funds and implication of private sector at infra-national level – 
possible to translate in light of the SIGMA readings
(12) as explicit references to 
the principles of efficiency, effectiveness and partnership. In 1998, the EC 
Regular Reports on the progress of each candidate country in the accession 
process appeared as possible sources for explaining and interpreting the Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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methods and techniques of administrative consolidation. In the same year, 
OECD-SIGMA proposed their first analysis on a “conventional administrative 
model: “Preparing Public Administration for the European Administrative 
Space”. In the context of national administrative reforms, it clearly pointed 
towards democratic principles, professionalisation of civil service and 
democratic administrative organization. Later, in the document entitled 
“European Principles of Public Administration”, OECD-SIGMA drew the 
picture of an “un-formalized acquis” (formed out of procedural, administrative 
principles possible to identify in EU member states) and categorized the 
existent administrative principles in Western Europe into four clusters: one 
dealing with the so-called predictable nature of the state and its administration 
(including principles like the rule of law, generously referred to by the literature 
as an example of how traditional administration is organized); one referring to 
openness and transparency (more appropriate for an NPM approach); another 
one dealing with efficiency and effectiveness (a similar aim, with different 
methods for Weber, NPM and JUG alike) and finally, the fourth pointing 
towards accountability (again, a concept of different meaning to bureaucrats). 
SIGMA and later on, the European Union validated these clusters as possible 
blueprints for administrative reforms (Iancu, 2010), and by that they basically 
sign a recipe to an administrative reform cocktail including elements of the 
Weberian bureaucracy, NPM and JUG. So it comes as no surprise that when 
urged to “change the system”, public managers in Romania faced a quite 
eclectic multi-choice exercise sheet. 
 
5. …With public managers as change agents… 
 
“Young creative person, of no more than 35 years old, interested in 
promoting change, highly adaptable, result-oriented with critical and analytical 
thinking and high skills of leading negotiation teams, looks for transition public 
administration in need for a professional reform”.  
That may very well be a humorous (yet quite accurate) reading of the 
provision of the legal text describing the general skills of 400-ish public 
managers in Romania.
(13) It is not entirely surprising that public managers 
where viewed as a deadly cocktail for inefficiency and rigidity: upon entering 
into force of their Statute
(14) in 2004, they were meant to create a professional 
and meritocratic body of civil servants, one capable of a “real cultural change”, 
EU style
(15). The body of the Statute contained even a Preamble where the 
carrot mechanism of the European accession was quite obviously present: while 
explaining the need for an enhancement in the civil service reform, the 
Romanian Government acknowledged the pressure of the “To do list” it agreed Diana-Camelia Iancu 
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upon opening the negotiation with the European Union and the risk of loosing 
the contract on the PHARE Project RO 0106.03 on “Developing a professional 
body of civil servants in public administration – Young Professional Scheme” 
(which provided an initial sum of 4 million Euro and promised at the date an 
additional 3,5 million Euro for its continuation).  Public managers were as such 
conceived as to approach the problems of the public sector in a creative manner, 
by introducing appropriate managerial tools in policy-making.
(16) And of these 
tools they were supposed to have learnt during their internships and 
postgraduate studies in old Member States (typically Great Britain, France and 
the Netherlands) and also, during the national training sessions aimed at 
developing their knowledge of human resource management, strategic 
management, public policy, EU policy-making, administrative law and 
accounting and budgeting. At the end of their trainings and internships, and 
after debating with their institutional mentor the necessary steps to be taken, the 
profile of the public manager would have looked as presented by Table 1.   
 
Table 1 
Core competencies for Romanian public managers
(17) 
Understand the basics of:  Know:  Be able to:  
Management    To orientate towards results  Plan and prioritize activities 
Act pro-active towards problem solving 
Act determinate  
Act accountable   
To make decisions  Think critical and analytical  
Decide and implement  
Take calculated risks 
Change management  Promote change and change naturally 
Human resource management  Train others 
Personal development  To develop him/herself  Learn continuously  
Be adaptable  
To think constructively   Think creatively 
Identify innovative solutions 
Communication   To develop productive relationships  Network 
Achieve the goals consensually  
To communicate efficiently  Communicate  
Influence, negotiate, and mediate 
Team spirit  Work in teams 
 
All these skills and competencies would have been used in order to ensure 
the efficiency of the public administration reform, by: “stimulating creative yet 
sound solutions for problem-solving and modernization of public sector 
performance; enhancing the institutional capacity of the administration; assess, 
review and recommend improvements for current administrative practices; 
making new public policies, strategies  and procedures; developing action plans Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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for implementing policies and strategies; estimate and manage human, 
financial, material and technical resources; and monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of public policies, strategies and programs” (excerpt from 
article 55 of GD 783/2005). 
If to shortly analyze the statute of the Romanian public manager between 
2004 and 2007, it comes as no surprise that it embodies characteristics similar 
to those of a CEO in private organizations (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Core competencies for CEOs
(18) 
Understand the basics of:  Know:  Be able to:  
 
 
 
Management   
 
 
Organizational development  
 
 
Personal and professional 
development  
 
Planning 
 
 
 
Vision setting  
 
 
 
 
Collaboration and partnership 
 
 
Communication  
 
 
Decision-making  
 
 
Governance  
 
 
 
The culture of the organization 
 
 
A personal approach to change 
management  
 
The organizations’ functions 
and competencies  
 
The organization’s future 
needs  
 
 
What can excite the 
imaginations of staff, the board 
and pertinent external groups 
 
 
Successful personal 
approach(es) to collaboration 
 
The public context in which the 
organization operates 
 
Personal decision-making style 
 
 
The principles of laws 
applicable to governance 
Lead strategic thinking and planning 
efforts 
Delegate appropriate decisions and 
responsibilities 
Make clear and timely decisions 
Create a sense of shared responsibility    
Constructively challenge those with power 
and authority 
Lead an efficient and effective 
organizational operation according to best 
practices, ethical guidelines and fiduciary 
requirements 
Create a work environment in which staff 
feel comfortable taking risks to help the 
organization meet its mission 
Detect and manage changes in the 
organization’s functioning, culture, or 
dynamics 
Educate others on the future directions 
and inspire them to be supporters and 
advocates 
Conduct ongoing personal and 
professional development 
Relate well to a diversity of individuals 
Create a positive and productive work 
environment 
Guide cross-team and cross-
organizational collaboration 
Use external consultants and experts 
effectively 
Manage competing interests  
Write and speak effectively and 
compellingly 
Convene and manage groups 
Work well as a team player 
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Colum 3 of Table 2 for instance describes the “to do”-s for CEOs, 
following the sequence presented by Colum 3 of Table 1: although CEOs add 
value to their organizations by acting as leaders and visionaries of the 
organization’s mission and goals, public managers are basically required to 
have similar activities. They should be able to manage, develop, communicate 
and decide upon the role of public organization and of the system as a whole, in 
light of their training in coping with the European mixed expectations. 
However, they are less free than a CEO is from its Shareholders Boards: public 
managers are civil servants working in the direct subordination of a high rank 
civil servant (or another top management position) but under the patronage of a 
politician (or more) that may not be too enthusiastic about him/her hiring 
people, controlling the outcomes and deciding the future directions for public 
action. At least not if the politician may happen to be in search of obedient 
personnel, as assumed in this argument. Should that be the case, then despite 
the very generous legal description of “can” and “cannot-s” of public managers, 
one should be able to find traces about the strings the politicians used for 
controlling their reform agents.   
 
6. … Coming to full-stop and reverse after 2007...  
 
In 2007 Romania became a full member of the European Union. As of 
that date, the European Commission stopped providing detailed feedback such 
the one given between 1998 and 2006. However, safeguard clauses on 
corruption and weak judicial system were raised. Since, the European 
Commission has started to issue Reports on the Coordination and Verification 
Mechanism twice per year. In 2008 the European Report of July declared that: 
“Romania presents a mixed picture. It has put the fundamental elements of a 
functioning system in place. But the foundation is fragile and decisions on 
corruption are highly politicized. Each step in the right direction endangers a 
divisive internal political debate, fostering legal uncertainty. Commitment to 
reform by Romania's key institutions and bodies as well as with regard to 
different benchmarks is uneven” (p. 6). One year later, the situation got worse: 
while in February 2009 maintaining the rule of law became a sensitive issue, in 
July the Commission raised the question whether the safeguard clause should 
be triggered (p. 6).  
What happened though, in the civil service arena? Following a 
documentary research of civil service related legislation between 2000 and 
2011 (Annex), it became obvious that post-accession regulations on civil 
service where altered as to better fit the expectations of the political leadership. Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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Although in 2007 a new Statute on civil servants was adopted and one year later 
it was followed by new regulations regarding public managers, the reforms 
gave green light to the political appointee to assess the civil servant in his/her 
subordination: former high rank civil servants (directors of deconcentrated 
bodies of the public administration and heads of public managers) were re-
converted into political appointees and the authority of assessing the 
performance of local civil servants was given to their superiors (instead of a 
national, independent body, like the former National Agency for Civil 
Servants). In practice, that usually meant that a politician would assess a civil 
servant (e.g. the mayor assessed the secretary of the city-hall; and the high rank 
civil servant would decide whether the public manager under his/her 
jurisdiction was competent or not) giving as such room for (more) political 
discretion. As advocated by Iancu and Ungureanu (2010), these transformations 
actually contributed to the politicization of the civil service. In fact, for public 
managers, the “de-forming process” was even more substantial: as of 2008 and 
the amendments adopted in 2011
(19), public managers lost their strategic role as 
reform experts.  
The data regarding the politicization and the diminish of the role played 
by public managers in Romanian public bureaucracies after 2007 were also 
validated by a set of elite interviews conducted between March-April 2012 on a 
group of 12 (twelve) active public managers. The interviews were semi-
structured and addressed to public managers with not more than 5 years 
working experience in the system, active at local level (4 persons), central level 
(7 persons) and European level (1 person) and dealing with regional 
development, tourism, finance and internal affairs. Interestingly enough, when 
asked to name several European values they feel that the Romanian public 
administration might gain from, 10 out of 12 respondents spoke of 
“professionalism”, 6 out of 12 named “respect for one’s profession and 
colleagues” and only 2 pointed towards “efficiency”. The excessive 
politicization, doubled by the lack of professionals and the confinement of 
public managers to routine work urged 10 out of 12 respondents to conclude 
that presently “there are only formal talks of reforms”, as “the top management 
agenda does not contain reform measures anymore”. More aggressively on that 
note, one of the public managers confessed that “we are asked to make things 
look good on paper, but the actual implementation of what we wrote does not 
basically exist”. Was the Young Professional Scheme a success? To this 
question, 10 out of 12 public managers responded “yes and no”: although the 
program created a trust-worthy body of civil servants, the actual working 
placement of public managers was significantly delayed (as of 2006 onward) Diana-Camelia Iancu 
 
116 
and the possibility of advocating change at organizational scale was 
considerably low. The general feeling of the interviews was that public 
managers are nothing but wasted experts who eagerly wait the five years 
contract with the Romanian government to end and move on to a more 
competitive working place (most likely, a private one).   
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper opened the discussion on three levels relevant to the studies of 
public administration reform in transition countries: the first refers to the 
assessment of the role the European Union played in monitoring the processes of 
decentralizing, coordinating, increasing efficiency of public services, while 
ensuring their transparency, etc. Scholars of Europeanization treat the European 
Union as a demanding actor, which applied sanctions and distributed awards 
among its applicants for the sake of reducing the degree of misfit between 
(amongst others) the former spoils system of administration (coming from a 
totalitarian experience) and Western bureaucracies. In doing so, it raised red flags 
and granted funds to reconstruct the administrative institutions of Romania, thus 
pressuring domestic actors to change themselves in a rather alert tempo. To what 
extent did this rhythm of change remain the same after the accession? And to 
what extent did the changes the European Union advocated for, create substantial 
practices after the accession? The argument here very briefly states that after 
obtaining the membership carrot, in the civil service, Romania began its return to 
its ‘old ways of doing business’, which basically meant politicization. Changes 
advocated between 2000 and 2007 in the area of civil service were only partly 
sustainable, and the documentary research of the legislation, doubled by a small 
scale expert interview session with public managers active in the Romanian 
public administration validated that hypothesis. 
The second aspect addressed here deals with the existent tension between 
the European requirements for action in transition bureaucracies. The well 
debated “European administrative space” and “consolidated administration” are 
obvious examples for the eclectic approach to “Western standards” in public 
administration. Built on Weber’s ideal bureaucracy model, reconfigured under 
the predicaments of NPM, JUG, etc., the consolidated administration is more of 
an eclectic theoretical tool rather than a practical concept, with technical 
connotations. Studying the concept of consolidated administration might in fact 
generate substantial contradictions whose balancing may prove quite difficult in 
practice. Re(De)-Forming public administration: an expert outlook on reform planning in Romania  
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Finally, this paper briefly addressed the issue of internal change of public 
administrations by discussing the role of public managers in the Romanian 
context. Described in the words of the accession reforms as genuine CEOs of 
public administration, public managers are currently performing routine duties, 
under the patronage of what seems to be a political employee. Is this all that is? 
Did the internal change of public administration fail under the pressure of 
politics? This paper did not address these questions, yet it surely aimed at 
triggering the attention on the need to further study the public administration 
reform in transition countries.  
 
Notes 
 
(1)  Paper prepared for the 20
th Annual NISPAcee Conference, May 23-26, 2012 - Ohrid, 
Macedonia.  
(2)  This section draws from the arguments presented by Iancu and Ungureanu (2010).  
(3)  For an in depth analysis of Niskanen’s model see Ungureanu (2012). 
(4)  See Reid and Kurt, 1988, 1999 for this approach to public organizations. 
(5)  This problem is called rational ignorance. 
(6)  This section uses some of the arguments presented by Iancu (2009).  
(7)  Inter alia, Hood (1991); Osborne and Gaebler (1992); Pollitt (1993); Rhodes (1996); Peters 
and Pierre (1998); Cope and Goodship (1999); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000); Denhardt and 
Denhardt (2000, p. 549); Kettl (2000); Lane (2000). 
(8)  A paraphrase of Denters and Rose (2005, p. 7).  
(9)  Article 4.3: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those 
authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority 
should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and 
economy”. 
(10) For the British case my reference is directed towards: DETR (1998a) and DETR (1998b). In 
the case of Australia, the document I refer to is SSA (2007). Comments on these documents 
are to be found, inter alia, at: Richards and Kavanagh (2000); Kavanagh and Richards 
(2001); Martin (2002); Signoretta and Craglia (2002); Downe and Martin (2003) or 
Christiansen and Laegreid (2005). 
(11) It is true however that, in the case of British joining-up practices, the government plays a 
central, hierarchical role; this aspect has been taken into consideration when deciding which 
paragraphs of the quoted documents are relevant.   
(12) SIGMA was created in 1992 as a joint initiative of the OECD Centre for Cooperation with 
non-members economies and PHARE. It declared mission was to “assist transition countries 
(PHARE beneficiaries) in increasing their administrative efficiency”. One of the documents 
relevant here was the one elaborated on 1999, dealing with the “European Principles for 
Public Administration”.  
(13) Article 53, GD 783/2005 on establishing the implementation methodology of the Stature of 
public managers, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no.717/09.08.2005.With 
regard to the total number of trained public managers, the available data speak of 428 
persons, of which 220 were in place, active in public authorities (Source: Memorandum on Diana-Camelia Iancu 
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the new statute on public managers, 2008). Presently, the official website on Young 
Professional Scheme (www.yps.ro) - the Project responsible for creating the public 
managers has no updated information on the whereabouts of its trainees or their professional 
accomplishments.    
(14) Statute on public managers - GO 56/2004, published in the Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 590/01.07.2004.  Since 2004, the Statute was amended several times (in 2008 and 2011). 
For the scope of this paper however, these amendments do not provide any major (relevant) 
changes and, as such, are not taken into consideration.  
(15) Excerpt from the Memorandum on the Statute of public managers (available online at: 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=5789, last access: April 10, 2012). 
(16) Article 55, GD 783/2005.  
(17) Adaptation of the Romanian reference competence framework for public managers. Source: 
http://www.yps.ro/pdfs/cadru_competente.pdf, last access: April 10, 2012.   
(18)  Adaptation of the Competencies for Chief Executive Officers of Private Foundations 
(Council of Foundations, Washington DC, 2006). Source: http://www.cof.org/files/ 
Documents/Emerging_Issues/06CEOFunctions.pdf, last access: April 10, 2012. 
(19) GD 78/2011 on establishing the implementation methodology of the Stature of public 
managers, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no.186/17.03.2011. 
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Annex 
 
National legal texts and European reports relevant  
to the selection of bureaucrats in Romania 
 
 
A.  National legal texts 
 
Year  Area of the regulation 
(provided by the official 
text) 
Official data 
(about publication) 
1999  Statute of Civil Servants  Law no.188/08.12.1999, Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 600/08.12.1999 
2003  Measures for ensuring 
transparency in exercising 
public offices and public 
functions 
Law no.161/19.04.2003, Official Gazette of Romania no. 279/21.04.2003 
 
2003 Organization  and 
development of civil 
servants’ career 
Governmental Decision no.1209/14.10.2003, Official Gazette of 
Romania no. 757/29.10.2003 
2004   Code of conduct for civil 
servants 
Law no.7/18.02.2004, Official Gazette of Romania no. 157/23.02.2004, 
republished in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 525/02.08.2007 
2004  Civil Servants Statute   Law no.188/08.12.1999 as republished in the Official Gazette of 
Romania no. 251/22.03.2004 
2006  Law amending the Civil 
Servant Statute 
Law no. 251/23.06.2003, Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 574/04.07.2006 
2007 Recruitment  of  high-level 
civil servants, their career 
management and mobility 
Governmental Decision no.341/2007, Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 247/12.04.2007 
 
2008  Norms for organization 
and development of the 
civil servants’ career 
Governmental Decision no. 611/2008, Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 530/14.07.2008, amended by Governmental Decision 
no.1173/24.09.2008, Official Gazette of Romania no. 677/02.10.2008 
2009  Measures for improving 
the public administration 
activity 
Governmental Decision no.37/22.04.2009, Official Gazette of Romania 
no. 264/22.04.2009 
 
2009  Civil Servants Statute   Law no.188/08.12.1999 – consolidated version (up to 22.04.2009), after 
second republication in the Official Gazette of Romania  
no. 365/29.05.2007 
2010  Law amending the Civil 
Servants Statute 
Law no.140/07.07.2010, Official Gazette of Romania no.471/08.07.2010 
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B.   European reports  
 
Year  Title of the document  Abbre-
viation 
1998  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 1998 
1999  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 1999 
2000  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 2000 
2001  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 2001 
2002  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 2002 
2003  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 2003 
2004  Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession  R 2004 
2005 Romania  – Comprehensive Monitoring Report  M 2005 
2006 Romania  – Comprehensive Monitoring Report, first release  M 2006a 
2006 Romania  – Comprehensive Monitoring Report, second release  M 2006b 
2007 - 
2011 
Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism  CVM 
 
 